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Abstract: This paper shows that the two oil shocks that occurred in 1974-85 and 2003-15 
inflicted sizable damage to total factor productivity (TFP) in France and Germany. These are 
resource-poor economies whose firms are importing most of their inputs of extractive 
commodities. The real prices they pay for them impact directly on their value added and 
hence on GDP in aggregate. We single out the price of crude oil as the most important and 
volatile of this set of highly correlated prices. This real price depends both on the world 
commodity market and on the exchange rates between the US dollar and the relevant 
European currencies, themselves determined by monetary policy in the US and in Europe. 
The significance of this mechanism is confirmed econometrically, and its quantitative 
implications are assessed. On average, these countries have lost more than 1% of potential 
TFP per year during these oil shocks, Germany being affected noticeably more severely than 
France. Historical analysis shows that episodes of US dollar appreciation have significant 
impacts on French and German TFP via this channel.  
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 The oil shock that took place between 1973 and 1986 (exclusive) has left a deep 
footprint in the memories of the economics profession. The word “stagflation” was then 
created to name the combination of rising inflation and unemployment that was observed at 
the time. Bruno and Sachs (1985) provided a powerful analysis of this phenomenon, 
emphasizing the supply-side impact of the shock. However, the received wisdom that 
stagflation was caused by the oil shock has been challenged by Barsky and Killian (2001), 
who offer a monetary alternative. Despite some attempts by a series of authors to attract 
attention to the New Century Oil Shock (NECOS) that took place between 2002 and 2016 
(exclusive), it did not have the same impact on the profession. Dvir and Rogoff (2009) have 
analyzed more than a century of oil price data, showing that NECOS was highly significant 
indeed by its size, although their sample does not follow it up to its end in 2015-16. Hamilton 
(2009) provides a thorough study of the causes and consequences of the first spike of 
NECOS, using data up to December 2008. Among other topics, he traces in detail the impact 
of the spike on the automobile industry. El-Gamal and Jaffe (2010) cannot either do full 
justice to NECOS, as their data stop in 2009, nearly halfway into the shock. Nevertheless, 
they bring out the key point that the prices of most extractive commodities tend to move quite 
closely together, at least for the big swings, so that the oil shocks involve in fact the nearly 
simultaneous boom and bust of a large number of extractive commodities prices. This 
confirms a point made by Bruno and Sachs (1985) 25 years before. Among others, Pirrong 
(2012) illustrates this point by looking at the price of copper, whose time profile is quite like 
that of crude oil, but his data set also stops in 2009. Similarly, Ross (2012) provides a much 
deeper analysis of the Old Century Oil Shock (OCOS) than of the more recent one. McNally 
(2017) offers a longer perspective, thanks to data that span up to 2015 for some series. The 
first objective of the present paper is to provide a useful description of OCOS and NECOS 
simultaneously, as it can be argued convincingly that the latter ended in the trough of January 
2016, opening up a new period, and that its magnitude was may be larger than the former’s.  
 
 The second objective of the present paper is to determine whether the current neglect 
of NECOS by the macroeconomics profession is deserved or not. Blanchard and Galì (2009) 
and Blanchard and Riggi (2013) have somehow addressed this question for the case of the 
USA, concluding that such neglect is in fact deserved in that case. Both papers split their 
samples into two periods, trying to compare them to see what structural changes could explain 
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the lack of impact of the NECOS that they find. Blanchard and Riggi (2013) emphasize 
improved wage flexibility between the two periods as a shock absorber. They also bring out 
that monetary policy became less responsive to short-run fluctuations, i.e., more Friedman-
like. However, their two sub-samples are far from obviously comparable. While the first one 
ends just at the end of the worst part of OCOS, on the way down in 1983, their second one 
ends in 2007. As shown below, NECOS was still on and biting until 2015. In other words, 
their second subsample truncates the worst part of NECOS and raises some legitimate 
suspicion about the validity of their conclusions. Some of the differences that they bring out 
might as well come from the fact that the first sub-sample includes a nearly full-blown oil 
shock while the second one stops at the first tremors of the second one. Some support for this 
diagnosis is provided by Hamilton (2009), who performs a post-sample test of the Blanchard-
Galì structural VAR model, using four additional quarters. It shows that the model does in 
fact predict that US real GDP growth would have been on average 0.7% higher over 2007Q4–
2008Q3 in the absence of the oil price spike. 
 
The time is ripe now to perform a more even-handed comparison of the 
macroeconomic impacts of the two big oil shocks as the required data are now available. 
However, we keep our ambition modest relative to Blanchard and Riggi (2013) who use a 
full-blown New-Keynesian structural VAR model applied to the US economy. Similarly, 
Lippi and Nobili (2012) use a structural VAR model, which distinguishes the impacts of the 
oil shocks on the US economy as a function of their nature, in the same spirit as Killian 
(2009). They distinguish demand shocks and supply shocks. We instead use a simple Neo-
Classical aggregate production function approach, to gauge the impacts of OCOS and NECOS 
on aggregate total factor productivity, using data from ALFRED St Louis. We do not either 
try to trace the impacts of TFP changes on the respective labor markets and unemployment, 
inflation, etc., as Bruno and Sachs (1985) have done. The model used is akin to Solow (1974), 
except that we assume that the third input beside capital and labor is imported, representing 
extractive commodities. The value added produced by extracting and shipping them does not 
accrue to the importer’s domestic GDP, but to the exporters’ ones, as a first approximation. 
This point is a basic datum of national accounting: GDP is just the sum total of all the value 
added by the firms of the domestic economy, while part of the domestic (gross) output is used 
up to pay for these imported inputs and is not included in GDP. It follows immediately that 
aggregate total factor productivity (TFP), which is computed using GDP, given domestic 
capital and labor, depends on the real prices paid for these imported inputs. Bruno and Sachs 
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(1985) have an extensive discussion of this point. The next section sketches the formal 
derivation of this prediction from the modified Solow (1974) model mentioned above.  
 
The rest of the paper aims at testing empirically the relevance of this simple theoretical 
prediction regarding the supply side of the macroeconomy. To gauge whether this subtle 
distinction is useful, we focus on the cases of mature industrialized economies of continental 
Europe, which have exhausted long ago their reserves of most extractive commodities. France 
and Germany are quite representative of this type of economies, and their experience through 
the two shocks is analyzed below. Strangely enough, most of the literature on oil shocks and 
the macroeconomy has focused on the US economy, which has now become the largest oil 
producer in the world, nicknamed “Saudi America” by The Economist. A case can be made 
that this issue is even more relevant for resource-poor economies like France and Germany. 
The data used in this study are in open access in ALFRED St Louis, the Archive Library of 
the Federal Reserve Bank’s Economic Data of St Louis. We take the TFP series from there, 
spanning 1971-2017. The first observation is only used here as a lagged value. These are 
yearly data, which determine the frequency we use for the other series too. Because of the 
long-haul perspective of the study, nothing much is lost by working with such frequency of 
observation.  
 
Most of these commodities’ prices tend to move in a highly correlated fashion, and we 
focus on the most important and most volatile of these imported input prices, namely that of 
crude oil (El-Gamal and Jaffe, 2010). For the sake of homogeneity, we use the price of the 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil over the whole period. It could be argued that the 
Brent crude, which is mainly pumped in the North Sea, has become over time the more 
relevant oil for European countries and that its price is always a few percentage points higher 
than WTI’s. This reflects its lower refining and transportation costs for neighboring European 
countries that Brent exporters can pocket as buyers arbitrage between the two. However, its 
production only started in the late 1970s and its dominant position only got established over 
time for these economies, with a drawn-out overlap period that raises some intractable issues 
for splicing the two series. Moreover, these two prices are highly correlated over time when 
they exist, making the choice between the two series a bit frivolous for estimation purposes. 
We first bring out graphically the sheer magnitude of the two oil shocks for these economies 
and offer some measurement to compare their sizes. An important wrinkle to add is that for 
these European economies, the exchange rate to the dollar is playing a big part in determining 
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the real price of oil paid by domestic firms. The crude price is determined in dollar terms in 
the world market while domestic firms buy and sell in domestic currency. As shown below, 
this may affect the precise dates at which the oil shocks hit France and Germany, as well as 
their amplitudes. We then move on to test econometrically these predictions using yearly data 
over the period 1972-2017 for these two countries.  
 
 Over our sample period, then, we find that the real price of oil does affect TFP 
significantly for these mature economies. Although the estimated response of TFP to changes 
in the real price of oil looks quite small, we must consider that these big oil shocks involve 
massive and sustained increases in the real price of oil. It follows that these shocks have 
inflicted some sizeable losses of potential TFP to these economies. However, we do find like 
Blanchard et al. that the magnitude of the impacts changed between the two big shocks, but 
this did not result from significant changes in the structure of the model. External 
determinants seem to have changed somehow the nature of the shocks, especially due to US 
monetary policy. It seems also that the creation of the Eurozone somehow increased the 
resilience of the French economy, at least for a while, without any similar change occurring in 
Germany. Although this is captured simply by using a dummy variable for 1999 on, while 
many other things happened over those years that could explain this contrasting finding, we 
offer some suggestions to explain it based on the key role played by Germany in the euro 
system and in anchoring member states’ currencies ever since monetary cooperation started in 
Europe in the early 1970. It seems thus that this mildly “Hayekian” de-nationalization of 
money (James, 2012) had some significant stabilizing effects with a beneficial impact on the 
supply side in France. 
 
2. GDP as Aggregate Domestic Value Added 
 
 Let us start from the basic Solow (1974) model, as does Hamilton (2009), where 
output Q is produced using capital K and labor L, as well as an additional input Z, capturing 
extractive commodities. Time t is also included as usual to capture the impact of exogenous 
technical progress. Lippi and Nobili (2012) use a CES version of the same model. 
 
 The production function is assumed well-behaved and reads: 
 
 ( , , , ).Q F K L Z t         (1) 
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 The new twist introduced here is that Z is entirely imported at a real price p in terms of 
output. This is admittedly an exaggeration, as even the most mature continental European 
economy still has some extractive resources left to exploit, but it is a convenient “stylized 
fact”, which captures the main point of this exercise.  
  
 The representative firm is assumed a price taker on the world market and its value 
added, i.e., GDP, is then determined as: 
 
  , , , max .
Z
Y K L p t Q p Z        (2) 
 
 The change in TFP is defined as the change in Y, holding K and L constant. It can be 
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.      (4) 
 
 Therefore, these simple calculations can be summarized by spelling out the basic 
testable proposition of this paper as: 
 
Proposition 1: Aggregate total factor productivity is a decreasing function of the price of 
imported inputs and an increasing one of exogenous technical progress.  
 
 Notice that the coefficient of the change in price (i) cannot be called the “share of oil 
in GDP”, as the oil bill paid by the representative firm is excluded from GDP, and (ii) it has 
no reason to remain constant over time, except when a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production 
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function is assumed. Our econometric findings presented below are roughly supportive of the 
latter constant-elasticity specification. 
 
3. The Two Massive Oil Shocks of the Last Half-Century 
 
Our starting date corresponds to a major shift in the market regime for oil in the world. 
Before that, since 1933, the world oil market was under a control regime, as the Interstate Oil 
Compact (Libecap, 1989, Smith, 2012) and the “Seven Sisters”, i.e., the largest oil companies, 
were in fact controlling oil output and prices very tightly (McNally, 2017, Ross, 2012). A 
major game change occurred over the two years 1971-72, as the Bretton Woods’ gold-
exchange standard was abandoned, on the one hand, independently followed by a loss of 
control on the part of the Interstate Oil Compact, on the other hand. The key point was that 
the Nixon administration had surreptitiously changed that regulating body’s agenda. In the 
1930s, the objective was to keep oil prices high enough so that the high-cost oil-producing 
states, like Illinois, Oklahoma, etc. could stay in business despite Texas’ huge extraction cost 
advantage. To achieve this goal, the Texas Railroad Commission took a leading position, as 
Texas was de facto the swing player in the market. Libecap (1989) shows this convincingly 
using illuminating historical evidence. However, Nixon had been elected on a platform to 
keep inflation under control and he chose a strategy involving price controls, with the support 
of Arthur Burns, the FED’s chairman he appointed in 1970. Hence, his administration exerted 
pressure on the Interstate Oil Compact, which is not a Federal agency, to open the gates to 
increase sales and lower prices (Smith, 2012). As excess reserves cannot be run down below 
zero, the limits of such a strategy are bound to be met soon. In the same movement, the Seven 
Sisters lost quite quickly their hold on oil production abroad, as a wave of national oil 
companies were created during the first half of the 1970s or so, culminating in the first years 
of OCOS (McNally, 2017, Ross, 2012). Although some of these national companies were 
pursuing a mainly political agenda, like the punitive price policy implemented by OPEC after 
the Yom Kippur war, this was partly offset by the discovery of large reserves in Alaska and 
the North Sea. Moreover, a proliferation of oil-producing countries took place, as many small 
exporters became profitable when the prices were high (Ross, 2012). The market thus became 




Figure 1 plots the nominal WTI crude oil price over our period of analysis. The two 
massive oil shocks can easily be seen, as well as their dates of occurrence that can be 
determined unambiguously. The natural definition to capture this visual evidence is to call an 
oil shock a major, i.e., large and lasting, boom-and-bust deviation from a hypothetical smooth 
path. We use a more precise definition in the empirical part below. Figure 1 brings out the 
contrast between these massive shocks and the smoother price fluctuations during the inter-
shock period. One cannot fail to notice that this smoother period includes what Stiglitz (2003) 
called “The Roaring Nineties”, “The World’s Most Prosperous Decade”. There is an issue 
about the years 1998-2002, which witnessed a mild spike in the WTI nominal price, peaking 
in 2000. From a US point of view, it does not seem to belong obviously to NECOS. However, 
we will see later that it was amplified significantly for France and Germany by a sizeable 
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Data Source: ALFRED St Louis 
 
Figure 1: Nominal WTI Oil Price and the Two Oil Shocks 
 
 The Unit Dollar Prices of French and German GDPs 
 A more substantive issue is involved in the choice of a deflator. Because our analysis 
focuses on imported inputs in the production process, the use of the CPI would be 
inappropriate. We use instead the GDP deflator, which may be interpreted as an index of the 
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market prices of domestic products. Then, this deflator must be translated into US $ terms 
using the market exchange rate for comparison with the WTI price of oil. We have used 
quarterly data to construct the series of the Unit Dollar Price of GDP in France and Germany, 
which are plotted in figure 2. The economies under study here have switched from a system of 
national exchange rates to the euro system, which involves a de-nationalization of money via 
a supra-national European central bank, the ECB. This came about gradually over the whole 
sample period (James, 2012). The “snake” was created in 1972 in which the member states 
agreed to limit the fluctuations of their exchange rates within a narrow 2 1/4 % band. France 
quit and returned into the snake at times, thus showing some residual autonomy with a 
negative impact on her credibility. Then, in the wake of the 1991 Maastricht treaty, the ECU 
was created, imposing even more discipline. A more decisive jump was made in January 
1999, when the euro started to be used exclusively for financial dealings and industrial 
transactions. Then the national currencies were fully replaced by the euro even for small day-
to-day private transactions in 2002. Hence, there is not just a statistical problem raised by the 
change in the units of account of the relevant currencies, but a deep systemic shift is in fact 
involved. The former problem is straightforward, and we just translated the national 
currencies exchange rates prior to that date using the official conversion rate of January 1, 
1999. The resulting deflator may be called the unit dollar price of domestic GDP. It can go up 
either because of inflation, as the GDP deflator goes up, or as a response to an appreciation of 
the domestic currency or the euro relative to the US $. This entails mechanically that the real 
price of oil can work as a channel of transmission of changes in the exchange rate, so that the 
dates of the actual oil shocks faced by France and Germany may differ from what we saw 
above. This turns out over our sample period to be an important source of shocks for France 
and Germany.  
 
Two main such “Dollar Shocks” are relevant in this respect and can be seen clearly 
from Figure 2. The latter plots the unit dollar prices of GDP in France and Germany, 
respectively, using different scales related to the different GDP deflators. Eyeballing the data 
shows convincingly that the main changes in the national series are obviously caused by 
common causes, except for minor details. The obvious external cause of disturbances is the 
US dollar. We thus observe that two major deviations in these series, labeled here “Volker 
Shock” and “Y2k Shock”, affected simultaneously the two series in a very similar fashion. 
Notice that we here define the shocks by only considering the appreciation phase of the US $, 
as it is not too clear from the plots when to end them otherwise. Paul Volker was made the 
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chairman of the FED in 1979 by Jimmy Carter and he endeavored to suppress the two-digit 
inflation soaring at the time by imposing a rigid monetarist policy. This made the interest rate 
jump in the two-digit range, hitting even 20% for a short while, and attracted a massive 



























Data Source: ALFRED St Louis 
 
Figure 2: Unit Dollar Price of GDP in France and Germany 
 
The second “pot-hole” we observe in the series occurred under Alan Greenspan’s 
chairmanship. Kohn (2012, Fig 1B, p.178)) presents an illuminating chart showing that Alan 
Greenspan was then obeying very closely the Taylor rule that induced a rise in the Federal 
Funds rate in two steps from 1995 to 2000 aimed at cooling down the US economy. After a 
peak above 6% in 2000, which justifies the “Y2k” label (rather than “Greenspan Shock”), 
Greenspan gave up the Taylor rule in the wake of 9/11 and started the “Great Deviation” by 
cutting the Federal Funds rate up to 3 percentage points below that recommended by the 
Taylor Rule (Taylor, 2012). He then caught up a bit a few months before the end of his term 
in 2006 in response to the increasing fiscal deficit entailed by the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. As mentioned above, the resulting appreciation of the US dollar relative to the euro 
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made a big change for French and German firms, transforming the mild WTI price spike of 
1998-2002 into a real shock. This is developed below. 
 
Lastly, notice that from 2008 on, the unit dollar prices of the two European countries 
GDPs went slowly downwards in a bumpy fashion, reflecting a slow and irregular 
depreciation of the euro relative to the US dollar, despite the quantitative easing strategy 
undertaken by Ben Bernanke since his landing at the FED in 2006. Taylor (2019) explains 
this evolution by comparing the strategies pursued by the FED, the ECB, and the Bank of 
Japan, using illuminating charts. Citing Allan Meltzer, he interprets the quantitative-easing or 
related strategies implemented by the three central banks as an example of “competitive 
devaluation”. In this race to the bottom, the ECB went further down than its competitors, as 
the euro depreciated against the two other currencies. Although it was less brutal than the 
Volker and Y2k shocks, this downward slide slowed down the bust phase of NECOS for the 
European firms. There is no doubt that the Eurozone was entering a turbulence episode that 
culminated with the Greek crisis, with some trouble also arising in other Eurozone member 
countries in the periphery.  
 
The Oil Shocks in France and Germany 
 Figure 3 plots the real WTI crude oil prices for France and Germany, respectively, 
over the 1971-2017 period, using the unit dollar prices of French and German GDPs as 
deflators. The numbers on the vertical axis may be interpreted as the WTI price expressed as a 
fraction of the unit dollar price of French or German GDP, although the scales are different 
for each curve. The French units can be read on the right-hand side. This nearly half-century 
may simply be characterized as a relatively stable 12-year episode between 1986 and 1998 
(inclusive), during which the real price fluctuates mildly, with a slight downward slope, 
bracketed by the two major oil shocks, lasting about 12 and 17 years, respectively. It is 
interesting to notice that the pure oil shocks and the dollar shocks channeled by the price of 
oil combine differently in the two cases. In OCOS, there is a large overlap, as the Volker 
shock is just amplifying the oil shock proper and slowing down the bust period for France and 
Germany. In contrast, the Y2k dollar shock occurs before the oil market goes wild. Hence, 
while the Volker dollar shock is just enhancing the oil price shock during OCOS, its successor 
is in fact taking a head-start before NECOS, just lengthening its duration by four years. It is 
therefore natural to define the extended NECOS (ENECOS) by including that part of the Y2k 
dollar shock whose impact on TFP was channeled by amplifying the 2000 nominal WTI price 
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spike into a large deviation of the real price of oil paid by domestic firms, i.e., the 1998-2002 
period, as seen above. The relevant ENECOS thus lasted from 1998 to 2016 (exclusive). 
Notice that the real price rise between 1998 and 2000 is slightly larger than the one between 


























Data Source: ALFRED St Louis 
 
Figure 3: The Two Major Oil Shocks in France and Germany Since 1971 
 
Impacts on French and German TFP 
 At first sight, it seems unlikely that the very bumpy, or even rugged, time profile of 
the real price of oil in France and Germany could explain the very smooth evolutions of TFP 
in these two countries over the near half-century under study. This diagnosis seems vindicated 
by looking at figure 4, which plots the Log TFP series for France and Germany over the 1971-
2017 period. Eyeballing the data suggests that:  
(i) there is a long-run tendency for TFP growth to slow down over time, and this is 
captured in the econometric analysis performed below by a quadratic trend in addition to the 
linear one. Moreover, it seems that the slowdown is not perfectly smooth, as two mild breaks 
in the trend seem to occur first about 1989-90, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall and 
the end of the Cold War, and second, more abruptly, about 2006-7. The latter period marks 
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the change in the Chairmanship of the FED, Ben Bernanke succeeding Alan Greenspan, soon 
to be followed by the financial crisis, as the Lehman brother’s bankruptcy was declared in 
2008. As mentioned above, a “competitive devaluation” episode followed, in the words of 
Meltzer and Taylor, during which the euro depreciated faster than the dollar (and the yen). 
Although this was most certainly not the aim pursued by the ECB, this depreciation of the 
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Data Source: ALFRED St Louis 
 
Figure 4: Log TFP for France and Germany: 1971-2017 
 
(ii) OCOS seems to be marked by two significant dents that cut TFP by a few 
percentage points in France, while Germany seems to be hit more severely by the Volker 
Shock, from which she seems to have a hard time recovering; the end of the Cold War seems 
to play a key part in this recovery, as both countries’ TFPs seem to follow very similar paths 
afterwards from 1991 on until 2009. Burda and Severgnini (2018) offer an analysis of the 
very steep recovery of German TFP between 1989 and 1993 at the Bundesländer (or region-
states for Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, and their surrounding regions) level. They show that this 
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brisk acceleration mainly took place in the newly re-unified eastern regions, where it petered 
out soon, leaving a steady TFP gap behind the West in its wake. 
(iii) during NECOS, the French TFP does not seem to bounce back from the 
significant shortfall that took place after 2006, while the German one seems to recover very 
quickly. 
 
 On the face of it, then, it seems that we do not need to invoke the oil shocks to explain 
what happened to French and German TFPs over the 1971-2017 period. The two series mostly 
differed markedly during the Cold War, and the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent re-
unification of Germany might be deemed to provide ample material to explain that. However, 
the more careful empirical analysis performed in the next section shows that the real price of 
oil cannot be dismissed as a key determinant of TFP in the long run, as predicted by (4). 
 
4. Econometric Analysis and Damage Assessment 
 
 The descriptive analysis performed in the previous section puts out the challenge of 
gauging whether the world has changed so much that NECOS can safely be neglected in the 
21st century macroeconomic context. To answer this question, we need both to evaluate the 
relevant sizes of the shocks as well as to estimate the resulting impact they have on TFP. We 
first perform some basic empirical analysis in the present section, focusing on testing the 
impact of the real price of oil on TFP, before assessing the damages inflicted on France and 
Germany in terms of lost potential TFP.  
 
 Testing the impact of real WTI oil price on TFP in France and Germany 
 Notice that TFP is given in ALFRED St Louis as of January 1st each year. Therefore, it 
is natural to lag all the relevant explanatory variables one period to capture their impact 
during the time when TFP changed to reach the given January 1st TFP number. We present the 
same equation estimated for France and Germany, respectively. The dependent variable is the 
log of TFP, and the real WTI price is similarly entered as a logarithm whose coefficient can 
thus be interpreted as an elasticity. The findings reported below suggest that it is estimated 
very precisely on our samples, as could be predicted assuming a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. As mentioned above, these economies have made a major shift in their 
macroeconomic policy framework between the two oil shocks. We investigate whether the 
creation of the euro made an important difference by including a euro dummy, taking the 
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value 1 from 1999 onwards. We tested whether this impact was due to a change in the 
elasticity with respect to the price of oil, using an interaction term between the euro dummy 
and the real price of oil (see Table A.2). This was rejected. Another institutional major change 
was the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war. This is captured by a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 up to 1989 and 0 afterwards. We also tried an interaction term 
between the Cold war dummy and the real price of oil, without any significant impact (see 
Table A.2). Finally, we include an auto-regressive mechanism for the error term to capture the 
drawn-out convergence dynamics of the random deviations from the deterministic part of the 
model and to estimate its speed of convergence. 
 
 Corroborated Predictions 
 Table 1 presents the findings for the two countries. All the included variables are 
highly significant at the 99% threshold except for the WTI price term which is so at the 95% 
one, and the context dummy variables (Coldwar and Euro) that impact only one country in 
turn. The oil price term’s coefficient’s p-values are 4.41% for France and 1.15% for Germany, 
representing strong confidence levels. The estimated elasticities are (minus) 1.08% for France 
and 1.77% for Germany, suggesting that the latter is in fact more sensitive to the real price of 
oil than the former. This might be due to the larger size of its manufacturing sector, which is 
arguably consuming more fossil fuel and other imported extractive commodities whose prices 
are strongly correlated with that of crude oil. Moreover, France relies a lot more on nuclear 
energy for electricity production than Germany, reducing relatively its dependence on fossil 
fuels, starting even before the mid-1970s (Hecht, 2009). President Giscard d’Estaing then 
stepped up the nuclear electricity generation program explicitly for reducing French 
dependence on imported oil during OCOS, a program that kept on growing for many years. 
The well-known motto was at that time: “In France, we have no oil, but we have ideas”. 
Although these estimates might suggest a small response to the oil shocks at first sight, the 
key point is that these small numbers are multiplied by huge numbers, given the sizes of the 
shocks involved. Some calculations are presented below to assess the damage inflicted to the 
two countries in terms of potential TFP.  
 
The trend term predicts an increase in TFP at the basic rate of 1.75% per year for 
France and 1.36% for Germany, while the negative sign of the quadratic trend suggests a 
slight tendency for this growth to slow down over time. We also find that joining the euro had 
a sizable positive impact on TFP in France, while it has no significant impact in Germany. 
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This suggests that the widely shared belief at the time that creating the euro was simply aimed 
at harnessing all the member countries’ currencies to the German Mark and its credibility was 
realistic. Our estimate is at least not negative for Germany, suggesting that the cost to that 
country’s credibility was negligible. Not surprisingly, we find that the Cold War was a real 
drain on Germany’s TFP, while it had no significant impact in this respect in France. The 
coefficients of the auto-regressive residuals are strongly significant and just above one half in 
both countries so that the average lags are just above 1 year and so are the half-lives of the 
deviations in the two countries. 
 
Table 1: The Determinants of TFP in France and Germany 
 
Dependent variable: log TFP France Germany 






























Number of Observations 45 45 
R2 0.9894 0.994 
F-test 593.8277 1056.031 
Durbin-Watson Statistics 1.5742 1.6734 
 
Econometric Package Used: EViews7. t-statistics in parentheses. 
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 Assessing the Damage 
 To assess the impact of the real WTI price shocks, including their extension in terms 
of dollar shocks, we must first define a counterfactual scenario that can be used as a 
benchmark. During the two shocks, we take as the counterfactual real price path for each 
country the one resulting from a constant growth rate between 1973 and 1986, for OCOS, and 
between 1998 and 2016, for ENECOS. This is the most natural assumption to make for 
describing what behavior the real WTI price would have displayed in a hypothetical “shock-
less” environment. On the one hand, Hotelling (1931) established the simple arbitrage rule 
that equates the growth rate of the real price of an exhaustible resource to some long-run 
expected interest rate, in equilibrium, and on the other hand, Friedman (1968) has revived the 
Wicksellian concept of “natural rate of interest”, understood as the interest rate that is 
consistent with macroeconomic stability (Wicksell, 1898). Hence, for the sake of determining 
a counterfactual path that the real price of WTI oil would have followed in the absence of the 
oil shocks, it is natural to assume that it would have grown at a constant rate, somehow related 
























Data Source: Author’s calculations based on ALFRED St Louis data. 
 
Figure 5: Actual and Counterfactual Real WTI Prices for France and Germany 
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 In France, these counterfactual growth rates would have been about 4.43% per annum 
during OCOS and 4.70% during ENECOS, while they would have been 5.01% and 5.02% per 
annum, respectively, for Germany. Figure 5 plots the actual and counterfactual real WTI oil 
prices for France and Germany during the 1971-2017 period to convince the reader that no 
tricks are hidden behind this choice of counterfactual paths. It is visually evident that using a 
linear path instead would not make much difference, but we could not invoke the Hotelling-




















Data Source: Author’s calculations from ALFRED St Louis’ data. The numbers are 
reproduced in appendix table A.1. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage Real WTI Price Deviations from Counterfactual 
 
 Figure 6 plots the real WTI price deviations from counterfactual for the two countries 
during the oil shocks, measured as percentage deviations from the counterfactual path as  
 c cti ti tip p p , in obvious notation. They are very similar, just hitting most of the time a bit 
harder in Germany. This is probably due to a slightly faster growth of the GDP deflator in 
France, which is not as sanguine against inflation as Germany (James, 2012). In both 
countries, it seems that the real price shock was larger in height during OCOS, when it peaked 
in 1981 at about 248 % against about 178% in France and in 2008 at 276 % against 192 % in 
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Figure 7: Percentage Losses in Potential TFP in France and Germany 
 
 To complete this assessment of the damage inflicted to the two economies, we ask the 
following question: by which percentage would TFP have been higher had the real WTI price 
followed the counterfactual path rather than the actual one? To answer it, we just need to 
produce a properly rescaled mirror image of figure 6 by multiplying each country’s real WTI 
price deviations by the relevant elasticity estimated in table 1, as implied by (4). Figure 7 
plots the findings, and the actual numbers are given in appendix table A.1. The plots show 
undoubtedly that Germany lost a lot more potential TFP than France to the oil shocks. At the 
worst points of the two shocks, in 1981 and 2008, respectively, Germany lost about twice as 
much potential TFP than France. In the former case, France lost 2.69 % in potential TFP, 
while Germany lost 4.89 %. In the latter case, France lost 1.82 % while Germany lost 3.40 %. 
As we know from the above, these striking differences are due both to the fact that the 
elasticity of her TFP with respect to the real price of oil is larger in absolute value (1.77 % vs. 
1.08 %), and to the larger amplitude of the oil shocks that hit her, as seen at figure 6. These 
results can be summarized by adding up the yearly percentage losses over the 12 and 17 years, 
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respectively. Although we find reasonably similar numbers for the total real WTI price 
deviations in the two countries, this translates into quite different losses in potential TFP 
because of the significantly different estimated elasticities. Table 2 presents the findings 
together with their average values per year in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Percentage Points of Potential TFP Lost to the Oil Shocks 
 


















Data Source: Author’s calculations from tables A.1 and 1. Averages in parentheses. 
 
 Despite the caveat due to the use of a simplistic albeit natural counterfactual path for 
generating the price deviations and their cost in terms of lost potential TFP, it is clear that 
table 2 does not allow us to neglect the impact of the two big oil shocks of the past half-
century. Given our econometric estimates and our quantification strategy, it turns out that 
Germany was even more severely hit than France. These findings support the claims that 
Germany’s TFP would have been on yearly average 2.98% higher during the 12 years of 
OCOS and 1.91% so during the 17 years of ENECOS. These are very sizable and sustained 
losses. Although France seems to have been more shielded from these shocks by the pattern 
of its industrial specialization, including its higher reliance on nuclear energy for electricity 
production, the damage incurred during the two shocks cannot be dismissed as irrelevant 
either. During OCOS, we find that TFP would have been on average 1.76% higher for 12 
years had the shock been avoided. Like in the case of Germany, we find that the average loss 
per year is smaller during the second shock, but its average value of 1.06% is still far from 
negligible. This is also true in aggregate terms for each country, respectively, but in a smaller 
proportion, falling from 35.72% to 32.55% in Germany and from 21.17% to 18.08% in 
France. These are large numbers that should play a more prominent part in policy debates, at 





 The econometric analysis performed in this paper and its quantitative implications 
called convincingly current macroeconomists to revisit their analyses of the recent “financial 
crisis” and its aftermath by paying more attention to the supply side impact of the New 
Century Oil Shock. This seems especially relevant for continental European countries that 
have almost exhausted their reserves of extractive commodities long ago. Not only do they 
need to import most of their inputs of extractive commodities, but they must pay for them 
mainly in US $. This entails that the price their pay in real terms depends not only on the 
market for crude oil and its boom and bust cycles, but on European and US monetary policies 
as well. The rare episodes of sustained appreciation of the US $ in terms of European 
currencies brought out above also took a toll on oil-using European firms that must be added 
to the pure oil-price shocks. Our estimates entail that France lost on average each year about 
1.76% of potential total factor productivity, ceteris paribus, during the 12 years that the Old 
Century Oil Shock lasted while Germany lost even more of it during the same period, about 
2.98%. During the Extended New Century Oil Shock, which lasted 17 years, the aggregate 
loss was spread out over a longer period and was on average a bit smaller in both countries, 
1.91% for Germany and 1.06% for France. Nevertheless, our findings do not provide any 
excuse for the current neglect of this kind of supply-side shocks by the macroeconomics 
profession. Our historical analysis suggests that the monetary policies pursued by the ECB 
and the FED played a part in these events, as the occasional depreciation of the euro relative 
to the US dollar kept the price of oil paid by French and German firms higher than it could 
have been, thus keeping aggregate TFP, and thus GDP ceteris paribus, below its potential 
value. Moreover, the size of the losses incurred by these European import-using firms suggest 
a clear explanation for why forward-looking financial markets had a nosedive during the 
recent “financial crisis”. Kate Kelly (2014) tells a suggestive anecdote in this sense by 
noticing that Lehman Brothers’ top professionals were very quick to move to the NYMEX to 
trade in primary commodities after their previous employer’s bankruptcy. But this is another 
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Table A.1: Real WTI Price Percentage Deviations from Counterfactual 
 
Dates France Germany 
OCOS - - 
1974 145.12% 131.41% 
1975 99.86% 113.45% 
1976 117.69% 127.82% 
1977 121.54% 119.03% 
1978 83.54% 80.59% 
1979 126.66% 127.01% 
1980 222.54% 238.61% 
1981 247.97% 276.48% 
1982 229.12% 238.00% 
1983 201.63% 197.12% 
1984 196.45% 197.10% 
1985 163.30% 171.86% 
ENECOS - - 
1999 31.39% 32.36% 
2000 124.05% 129.87% 
2001 85.32% 90.36% 
2002 66.85% 70.38% 
2003 52.03% 59.44% 
2004 73.60% 81.59% 
2005 122.95% 134.16% 
2006 138.78% 157.27% 
2007 122.58% 141.14% 
2008 167.77% 192.03% 
2009 67.64% 78.12% 
2010 114.33% 127.61% 
2011 128.69% 144.32% 
2012 131.29% 145.48% 
2013 122.61% 130.51% 
2014 101.30% 104.80% 
2015 185.30% 19.71% 
 
Data Source: Author’s calculations (see Figure 6). 
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Table A.2: Test of Euro-Real Oil Price and Cold War-Real Oil Price Interaction Terms 
 
Dep. variable: log TFP France Germany 
































Interaction Euro*Log Real 








Interaction Cold War*Log 































Number of Observations 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.9895 0.9895 0.9941 0.9940 
F-test 497.3814 497.7286 884.0577 881.6750 
Durbin-Watson Statistics 1.5719 1.5787 1.6591 1.6658 
 




Data Information: The annual raw series of Total Factor Productivity come from the 
Archive Library of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Economic Data. The GDP Deflators 
and the Exchange Rates come from the same source as quarterly data. They have been 
combined to produce the Unit Dollar Prices of French and German GDPs in quarterly data 
form, and then averaged year-wise to produce annual data for estimation purposes. The 
nominal WTI Oil price series come from the same source as monthly data and have been 
averaged to produce annual data for estimation purposes. The computer package used is 
EViews 7 version 7. The routines used for estimation, testing and plotting are pre-
programmed and no additional programming has been performed. 
 
 
